Tuesday 23 October 2012

My report on the ISSAT/DCAF resource library website

My report is now also to be found on the ISSAT/DCAF resource library website. I am very happy about this as the study may reach a broader audience.

I did an internship at DCAF in 2010. DCAF is an international foundation established in 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss Confederation, as the 'Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces'. DCAF contributes to enhancing security sector governance (SSG) through security sector reform (SSR). The Centre works to support effective, efficient security sectors which are accountable to the state and its citizens. DCAF's work is underpinned by the acknowledgement that security, development and the rule of law are essential preconditions for sustainable peace.
DCAF’s International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) provides practical support to the international community in its efforts to improve security and justice, primarily in conflict-affected and fragile states. It does this by working with a group of member states and institutions to develop and promote good security and justice reform practices and principles, and by helping its members to build their capacity to support national and regional security and justice reform processes.

For those who want to know more about SSR, DCAF provides a number of backgrounders on different subjects connected to reforms of the security and justice sector. There are also a number of other publications available for free on their website. 

Also, ISSAT provides an introductory course on SSR in co-operation with UNITAR. It is an online course free of charge. 

Saturday 20 October 2012

Willing and Able? Challenges to Security Sector Reform in Weak Post-war States - Insights from the Central African Republic.

My report is finally printed and can be found here.. I provide you with the summary below.

Security sector reform (SSR) is an integral part of the international community’s efforts to build peace and enhance security in weak post-war states. It has, however, proven difficult to undertake SSR in such contexts. A number of factors constitute a challenge to create security forces that are able to provide
security to the population.

Based on previous research, this report highlights some of the challenges to SSR in weak post-war states. Through an analysis of the SSR process in the Central African Republic, this study shows that informal power structures, a volatile security situation and failure to understand how SSR is influenced by other political processes, negatively impact on the prospect for successful implementation of reforms. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that weak capacity and lack of political will on behalf of the national government, is a challenge to local ownership and sustainable reforms. Despite a holistic approach to reforms aiming to improve both the capacity of the security forces and to increase democratic control of the security institutions, insufficient international engagement, scarce resources, lack of strategic direction and inadequate donor coordination have limited the prospect for implementation of reforms.

Wednesday 10 October 2012

Raiding Sovereignty in Central African Borderlands by Louisa Nicolaysen Lombard

This dissertation just came out so I haven't had time to read it properly but, given the author’s experience and field work in the CAR and elsewhere I am convinced that it can't be any less that brilliant. Please have a look at Raiding Sovereignty in Central African Borderlands

To be back but somewhere else


Well, to be honest I do think that, given the limitations and restrictions, my thesis is quite boring and does not really give any added value. However, very soon a report is to be published. I had the opportunity to use the findings from my field research in this report, which feels good. As it will be available for free I will put the link here in due time. As for now, I'll just post a short summary of the report (quoting the summary in the report) and as soon as it is on the website I’ll let you know. So here it goes:

“Security sector reform (SSR) is an integral part of the international community’s efforts to build peace and enhance security in weak post-war states. It has, however, proven difficult to undertake SSR in such contexts. A number of factors constitute a challenge to create security forces that are able to provide security to the population.  

Based on previous research, this report highlights some of the challenges to SSR in weak post-war states. Through an analysis of the SSR process in the Central African Republic, this study shows that informal power structures, a volatile security situation and failure to understand how SSR is influenced by other political processes, negatively impact on the prospect for successful implementation of reforms. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that weak capacity and lack of political will on behalf of the national government, is a challenge to local ownership and sustainable reforms. Despite a holistic approach to reforms aiming to improve both the capacity of the security forces and to increase democratic control of the security institutions, insufficient international engagement, scarce resources, lack of strategic direction and inadequate donor coordination have limited the prospect for implementation of reforms.”

Well, not very surprising or new but I assure you that some of the details in the actual report are quite interesting. Read it!

As for me, we’ll see. Currently I am in Brussels and only time will tell where I go next. Insh’allah and I post again soon. 

Monday 28 May 2012

Final seminars and the end of an era

I have not posted any updates on the work with the thesis in a very long time. Tomorrow I will defend it at the final seminars and as soon as that has been done I will make the necessary adjustments and post some kind of summary of the findings here.

It feels very strange that this process now is coming to an end. I have lived with this thesis for more than a year. I started to plan the field study during Christmas, one and a half years ago and soon I will have the final product in my hand. It will be  a relief but also sort of sad to let go of it. The process has been so rewarding, in so many ways.

Times goes by so fast. It is a very odd feeling to read it now when its almost finalised. The name of the final product is Security Sector Reform in Weak Post-War States - Challenges to Implementation: Insights from the Central African Republic.

I will share the findings with those interested here shortly.

Monday 7 May 2012

Witchcraft in the CAR

A very interesting episode on witchcraft laws in the CAR. May enhance the understanding of the problems with not only corruption of the judiciary  but also how  "lynch law" is a threat to rule of law, fair trials and how rumors often are enough evidence to convict prisoners, if they are convicted at all.

Friday 4 May 2012

No vision but a vicious circle of poverty, corruption and lack of investment


Six weeks ago two people I got to know in Bangui, one of them quite well, were imprisoned without charge after discovering a suspected Lord’s Resistance Army massacre in the area where they operate a safari business. Although I heard about this at a very early stage it is only now that Swedish and British press have paid some attention to these unfortunate events.
In brief, David, who works for the safari company found a number of mutilated dead bodies while working in the area. He contacted his boss, Erik, and got in touch with the authorities who came to investigate the crime scene. Unfortunately there was not much of an investigation but the soldiers who were meant to conduct the investigation seemed scared and just took some pictures of the bodies with their mobile phones. Both Erik and David voluntarily went to Bangui to answer some questions but were instead imprisoned without charges together with ten of their Central African employees

That was six weeks ago and still no charges have been presented.
They are both alright and treated well, but obviously the situation is quite frustrationg, for them and their families. For some more information in Swedish have a look at these three websites and for some first-hand information have a look at Erik’s wife’s blog 
There are also some articles in English and in French
According to Central African law, a person cannot be kept in custody this long without charges. It is unclear why these men are locked up. One possible explanation is greed, as poorly paid employees are in urgent need for additional cash, civil servants at all levels within the administration are tempted to do “additional business” due to the bad economic situation of the country.
The economy of the CAR is at a terrible state, the country is dependent on foreign aid and is ranked the second last business friendly country in the world (2011), according to the World bank Group. The lower the ranking on the “ease of doing business index” means the less conducive is the regulatory environment to the starting and operation of a local firm. Only Chad is ranked lower.
In Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index which score countries on how corrupt their public sectors are perceived the CAR scores 2.2 together with Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Nepal, Papua New Guinea and Paraguay. The less corrupt country New Zealand scores 9.5 out of 10 and in the bottom of the list you find Somalia and North Korea with score 1. These indexes obviously must be red with some caution but they do say a fair bit about the situation in the country when it comes to corruption and the prospects for investment (both foreign and domestic).
My experience from the CAR is that yes, it is very corrupt indeed and yes, it seems to be a real hustle to open a business and operate it, but some people do which is the only way to create jobs and get the economy going. The problem is that corruption is an integral part of the system. It is a way for people to survive and get through due to extremely low salaries and months of salary arrears, at the same time it is the wide spread corruption that has created such conditions in the first place which gives those in power an opportunity to benefit from their positions. The CAR is a country with fertile land and good conditions for developing the agricultural sector; it is not cursed by draughts as many countries in the Sahel region for example. Furthermore there are diamonds, timber, gold and uranium and other minerals. Although the CAR has been ravaged by violent conflict for a long time it is not a war torn state like many others; there was never a state there to start with, not even when it was a part of French Equatorial Africa before independence. However, the potentials for the CAR are great, it could be an African Switzerland but there is very little to build on.

Not many foreigners are tempted to invest in a country with such high levels of corruption, bad infrastructure and weak rule of law. Furthermore the whole region is politically unstable with huge security problems. In addition some foreign companies are only interested in profiting from the resources in the country without actually contributing to the economic development. I had some interesting encounters with foreign investors during my stay in Bangui. In an earlier post I wrote about when I had drinks at the president’s sister's house , who is also a depute in the general assembly. As you can read in the post a foreign company wanted to invest in the energy sector. They were willing to do so despite the unstable political situation but eventually there was no deal due to all the complications with starting a business in the country. Important to remember is that the company already was operating in Uganda, Cameroon and some other places but they eventually considered the business climate in the CAR too difficult.
On the positive side despite all the problems in the country the press is relatively free. The CAR comes just after Italy on the press freedom index by Reporters without borders and is ranked higher than many other European countries  My personal experience is that the press is relatively critical towards the government and many journalists freely speak their mind. In 2005 the media law decriminalised media offences, nevertheless journalists are imprisoned now and then. On 26 January a court in Bangui gave Ferdinand Samba, the editor of the daily Le Démocrate, a 10-month jail sentence. Mr Samba also had to pay a 1500 euro fine and the newspaper was closed down. Mr Samba was charged with defaming and insulting the finance minister and “inciting hatred” against him  After 3 months of imprisonment the President Francois Bozizé, who is related to the finance minister, granted Mr Samba a pardon on the 3 of May , on the World Press Freedom Day (!). 
This shows that there are obviously constraints on the freedom of the press in the CAR but I believe that the main problem is that people don’t have access to the journals, that they cannot read or can’t afford a radio. Only half of the country’s population over 15 can read and write.  The CAR was ranked a low human development country in 2011 , and was among the bottom ten countries on the list
So what has all this to do with the illegal imprisonment of a Swedish and a British national (and several Central Africans with them)? Well, as the Central African on-line newspaper Centrafrique-presse.com writes; the safari company employs some 250 central Africans and generates large incomes for the state and the government in forms of taxes, fees and rents for the land they use. The journalist writes that the main question for the CAR at this point in time is about development, for this domestic and foreign investment is needed. To imprison the owner and employees of a serious business that contributes to the treasury of the state can only be counterproductive and by forcing the Central African Wildlife Adventures to close down its business for no good reason what so ever, is to “fermer son premier robinet” i.e. to cut off the main source of income as this may scare away other possible investors and have a negative impact on the development partners willingness to provide aid.
This is a vicious circle of poverty and instability that generates corruption which in turn scare off investors and possible partners which then increases poverty and instability. The question of rule of law is not only about legislation but how to actually implement it and apply it, as the case with both Mr Samba and the imprisonment of Erik and David shows; the mere existance of a law does not protect you. There are some indications that Erik and David were arrested because some people saw the opportunity to get some money out of them. It is highly likely. Obviously it is very short sighted as it might diminish the income for everybody in the long term. However, it is not that strange that people try to get the most out of every opportunity when the future is so uncertain, tragically this only increase the prospect for an uncertain future, another vicious circle.
So what to do?  I believe that the most important thing is to break these vicious circles. This is a challenging task, everyone who once has been caught up in a vicious circle knows how hard it is to break the pattern. You have to want it, but you also have to have the capacity to do it. Perhaps outsiders can provide and support when it comes to capacity but no one can force someone else to want to do something. However, my experience from the CAR is that many people in Bangui were deeply unsatisfied with the current situation, some of them didn’t have the capacity to do something about it, some of them lacked the will, but I got the feeling that in most cases it was actually about something else; a feeling of despair, of being forgotten and a disbelief in the possibilities of change. Many people I spoke to said that there is no vision for the future of the country, no strong political movement that can unite people. Everyone just thinks about him/herself.
The Central African Republic needs a vision for the future.

Wednesday 28 March 2012

I comment on the Kony 2012 campaign and AU military operation

Here is a translation of my comments on the Kony 2012 campaign and the challenges to the AU military operation.

AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’ Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) officially launched

On Saturday 24 March the African Union (AU) initiative against LRA was launched during a ceremony in Juba, South Sudan. I have already posted about this military operation which has the following objectives: strengthen the response capacity of the countries affected by the atrocities of the LRA, in order to create inherent capabilities; create an environment conducive to the stabilisation of the region free of LRA atrocities and inclusive of a political process within the framework of the Juba Agreement, if and when duly signed; and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected areas. 

The operation was authorised by the AU Peace and Security Council on the 22 November last year but it has taken some time for the Regional Task Force (RTF) to become operational. Even though the armies from the affected countries have been fighting the LRA for some time (Ugandan troops have been in the area since 2008) the AU RCI-LRA is meant to coordinate these efforts. Although the RCI-LRA is supported by the UN and the US there is no UN Security Council resolution. Last year, however, the UN Security Council requested the UN Secretary General Special Representative for Central Africa and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), Abou Moussa, to finalise a regional LRA strategy. A few days ago on March 23 representatives of the UN, African Union and the UN stabilisation mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) provided an update on the regional strategy. 

The RTF has its headquarters in Yambio, South Sudan and will be led by an Ugandan commander, Dick Prit Olum. Senior commanders from Uganda, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR) will be in charge of a contingent of 5,000 soldiers but it is not yet clear whether force commanders will be in operational command of soldiers from other nations. The initiative allows for cross border operations and is meant to improve cooperation and intelligence sharing between the state security forces active in the region as well as between those and the UN missions in South Sudan and DRC. 

The European Union (EU) has pledged 9 million euros in humanitarian aid for the affected populations. EU also financially supports the AU Special Envoy for LRA affected areas, Francisco Madeira, but has so far been reluctant to provide any support to the military operation as there are no mechanisms for accountability, no clear plan for civilian protection and there is no UN mandate for the operation. Apparently unspecified international partners have promised to support the AU military operation although the four countries, CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda remain responsible for covering their costs for the operations.  

I really don’t know what the chances are to find LRA and Joseph Kony in this area the size of Sweden covered in dense forest with very few roads. There is always a risk with military operations and given the past atrocities committed by the security forces that now will participate in the operation, the prospect for civilian protection is rather dim.

Thursday 22 March 2012

Coup d'état in Mali

CAR is a country that has experienced several coup d'état over the decades, In Mali this is apparently happening now. This blog updates from the capital Bamako.

The mutineers are according to Jeune Afrique unhappy with the lack of equipment and supplies which has hindered the military to defeat the Touareg rebellion in the north. The mutineers, who call themselves le Comité National pour le Redressement de la Démocratie et la Restauration de l'Etat (CNRDRE) have suspended the constitution, the governement and the state institutions have been dissolved. The second part of the mutineers' declaration can be found here. The president Amadou Toumani Touré, who was meant to step down in the upcoming elections and probably would have done so, is nowhere to be found and several ministers in the government have been arrested


Wednesday 14 March 2012

Kony 2012 and the Ambassador - CAR is finally on the map

Eventually the Central African Republic (CAR), a blank spot on the map, gets some attention or at least people now know that it is a country. When I was going there in August people would ask me things like “But what’s the name of the COUNTRY?” That’s the name I said whereas the person would ask “Ohh, but what was the name of it before?” Well, before independence the French used to call it Oubangui-Chari and the person would look puzzled. It is a blank spot, even for many Africans. Its geographic location is quite obvious from the name but for those who still don’t know where it is click here.

The Kony 2012 campaign put CAR on the map and now the Danish documentary the Ambassador, which I mentioned in an earlier post in September last year, is getting some attention. The film is discussed in an article in Foreign Policy and can now be streamed on Swedish National TV  until 12 of April. The film was released in the beginning of October last year and was shown at the Sundance film festival earlier this year and has been on the cinemas in Denmark and Norway (and elsewhere). 

The Danish journalist Mads Brügger goes to CAR with a diplomatic passport (Liberian) and a hidden camera to uncover the endemic corruption that allows some people to profit on Africa’s resources. The film shows how diplomats are involved in shady business, including diamond smuggling.  Brügger is a witty man with tons of sense of humour, which provokes many since the film is not one where Africans are victimised and needs to be saved by the “white man”. Rather it shows the dirty reality of how many white men contribute to CAR’s continuing dysfunction (as in many other countries). 

It is definitely worth to watch. When I was in Bangui I often was disgusted by the behaviour of some people, which I have mentioned in earlier posts. Comments like “We just keep them floating”, “We are just helping them from falling into complete anarchy” and “They need someone from the outside, like the UN or France (!), to get this country back in its feet”, were common place. CAR is to a large extent still France’s playground where anything is possible, for those with diplomatic status and money that is…

So, the documentary the Ambassador can be streamed here (I hope it works outside Europe, I am not sure about that though.) Have a look, have a laugh because somehow what to do about it? When all is crap you need to laugh at the misery, very much in line with  the Central African sense of humour I learned to love when I was there..

Thursday 8 March 2012

Erin in Juba

I have this blog on my blog list but this post is a must read...

Kony 2012 - how to make complex issues simple

I am sure most of you by now have heard about the campaign and film  that the US lobby organisation InvisibleChildren launched. It has, as often in the case of conflict, led to a highly polarised debate. The problem with the campaign is not that Invisible Children is an organisation with a murky agenda. They surely have good intentions and have done some respectable work (for example by extending the Early Warning Radio Network, launching Mobile Response Teams, and creating the LRA Crisis Tracker, which allows communities in the region the ability to receive warnings of LRA activity and alert local security forces to LRA violence) BUT good intentions can have unintended consequences.  

In this case, with the Kony 2012 campaign, the main problem is that Invisible Children reproduce a stereotype of Joseph Kony and LRA that has very little to do with reality. I think seven points are important to make:


  • LRA has not been active in Uganda since 2006, hence the group is not a security threat to the population in that country today 
  • LRA is not an army of children, although LRA abducts children the bulk of the combatants consists of adolescents or adults and numbers a few hundreds although it is hard to know
  • LRA is one of many other security threats to civilians and children in the region, these threats include other rebel groups, criminal gangs and state security forces
  • The state security forces in the region are notorious for committing crimes against civilians, so what is the likelihood they will be able or willing to protect the population?
  • To train and equip these security forces will most likely lead to further militarisation of the affected countries, hence it will increase the insecurity in the region
  • Invisible Children’s board is comprised of Americans, not Ugandans or any other Africans
  • Invisible Children does not represent people affected by LRA violence, hence Africans are once again deprived of agency and portrayed as helpless victims who needs to be saved 

Since there are so many good, informative, critical and interesting comments out there by now I will not further elaborate on this but refer you to those articles, comments and blogs. You are just one click away. 

One last comment; the solution to (armed) conflicts is never to demonise the enemy, on the contrary, this is often what starts and keeps a conflict going on for years, decades or even centuries. To launch a campaign film without any nuance whatsoever, in which one man is portrayed as bad simplifies the reality and takes the whole problem out of its context. I don’t think that will help anyone. However, if we look at the campaign with critical eyes perhaps this “blank spot” on the map will get some attention. The question is if this will bring something good? 

I guess time will tell, good intentions may have unintended consequences …

Thursday 1 March 2012

My report on LRA published and printed

Finally the report I have written on LRA in Central Africa is published and printed. Unfortunately it is in Swedish but for those who understand this exotic language the report can be downloaded free of charge from the FOI website

Monday 20 February 2012

Bring the locals back in?

I got a comment on the post AU military operation - the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative Against the Lord’s Resistance Army from a Swedish woman, Emelie, who is raised in CAR and has spent many years in the area where the LRA currently is operating. She pointed out that the people in the affected areas often express how they are negative towards developing the infrastructure as it would open up the way for the rebels. I thought that was very interesting as this is an opinion that I have not encountered in the reports or interviews when I did research for the study of LRA in Central Africa. As Emelie says, although one might disagree with that it is difficult to work against the will of the local people. 

I immediately thought of how this fear also might apply to the state security forces that has quite an awful record when it comes to human rights in this region. So perhaps the people do not only fear that the rebels might have better access to prey upon them but also that the badly trained often abusive state security forces will increase its presence. 

What Emelie brings up is connected to a broader problem; the tendency of international actors to disregard the local level of conflict as has convincingly been demonstrated by Sevérine Autesserre in her book The trouble with the Congo . Autesserre demonstrates why international peacebuilders fail to address the local causes of peace process failures. She concludes that the reasons for this is that the international actor’s understanding of violence and intervention is shaped by a post-conflict peacebuilding frame which frames local conflict resolution as irrelevant and illegitimate. She analyses this in the case of the DRC and finds that this frame includes four key elements:

  • International actors labeled DRC a post-conflict situation,
  • they believed that violence there was innate and therefore acceptable even in peacetime,
  • they conceptualised international intervention as exclusively concerned with the national and international realms,
  • they saw holding elections, as opposed to local conflict resolution, as a workable, appropriate, and effective tool for state- and peacebuilding

Her article Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention  also gives a good summary of her findings and is free to download for those who don’t feel like buying the book. For those who can’t be bothered to read at all there is a recorded lecture from last year available

Sara Hellmüller argues that increased inclusion of local perspectives in peace processes can contribute to shifting the international community’s focus on who has agency in the process, which could render the concept of human security more effective. She means that although the international community has shifted its protection focus from states to individuals since the introduction of the concept human security in 1994 their focus of who is assigned agency in a conflict context hasn’t. Very interesting indeed.

The lack of taking into account local levels of violence and local perceptions has severe implications on the efficiency and results of peace building programmes supported by the international community. In the report on LRA in Central Africa I mention how the local perceptions of what should be done to end the conflict often clash with ideas about the added value of international law, in particular the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants. 

During one of my courses in the beginning of the master’s program at Uppsala a professor who has conducted research on the Balkans held a lecture on this topic. He brought up the issue of local perceptions of the sentences of war criminal using the example of Biljana Plavšić (Биљана Плавшић) who is a former president of Republika Srpska. She was tried for war crimes in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for war crimes committed during the Bosnian war. She plea bargained with the prosecutor and only served two-thirds of her sentence in Sweden (!) and was released 27 October 2009. Many of the victims of war crimes committed during the Bosnian war felt that this was a bad joke and questioned that kind of justice. My professor had spoken to people who would have preferred Biljana Plavšić to get sentenced to live their lives: in poverty, with no electricity, struggling to get food, no job, no money, hence no future. As one woman put it: Why not let her live here, in our village, and everyday feel ashamed of what she did, let her experience how we live, that would be a punishment. Instead she served her sentence in a country known for having one of the most humane penitentiary systems in the world (humane is a good thing though, but it is not my point here.)

I am not arguing for or against the ICC, I am just saying that often local perceptions of justice are dismissed and not taken into account. It all comes down to the question why do we do it? To make ourselves feel better? Or do we care to actually listen to those affected so that they can have a participatory role? 

I think it’s about time to bring the locals back in….




Wednesday 15 February 2012

To build capacity or control the armed forces?

For those of you who understand French have a look at this interview with president Bozizé. Among other things he laments about the fact that the CAR government didn't receive a single penny in budget support last year. The lack of funding has been one of the main obstacles to the implementation of SSR but it is closely connected to the fact that the government has prioritised capacity building of the FACA and police over democratic control of the armed forces, which does not converge with the donor's priorities. In my report on Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Central Africa I also mention how the governments in the region (i.e. Uganda, CAR, DRC and South Sudan) try to use the presence of the LRA as a pretext to build up their armies. There is always a balance between capacity building and strengthening democratic control, but support and training of the militaries without  the latter will only contribute to further militarisation of those societies.

I don't think that is what the population needs...

Saturday 28 January 2012

AU military operation - the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative Against the Lord’s Resistance Army

I have now finalised the report on LRA in Central Africa. Unfortunately it is in Swedish but I’ll try to summarise the report and the main findings below.

During the autumn of 2011 the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) once again appeared on the international agenda as the AU, USA, and the UN decided to halt the rebels’ progress. During many years the LRA has had a negative impact on the security situation in Central Africa. The Ugandan rebel group has remained a threat against the security of the civilian population in the region over the last years, and has contributed to instability in the Central African region. The group operates in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, an unstable area with weak infrastructure. Regional and international actors have to a large extent failed to protect civilians against LRA atrocities, which has contributed to an emerging humanitarian disaster in the region.

The study provides a short description of the origins, motives and structure of the LRA, as well as an overview of how regional and international actors have responded to the group’s presence in the region. The aim is to increase the understanding of the rebel’s incentives with the objective to identify potential solutions to the problems they cause in Central Africa. 


Among other things the study shows how the African Union (AU) is in need of external support to enhance its capacity to act in in such a context. Furthermore, the study highlights what challenges international and regional actors face when operating in areas where state capacity is low or non-existing. The study concludes that one crucial factor is to develop the infrastructure in the region. In the short term, improved infrastructure could facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid. In the long term it can have a positive impact on political and socio-economic developments and improved infrastructure might threaten the existence of the rebel group. Equally important is for international actors to support the AU regional initiative to integrate planning of how to protect civilians in all military operations. The state security forces in the region face severe challenges due to weak capacity, insufficient training and lack of mechanisms for accountability and are therefore in need of support to be able to fulfill their task. The report also highlights the importance of better coordination between the state security forces, ongoing UN missions and other involved actors. Finally potential political solutions to the problem with LRA are discussed.
    
What I think is particularly puzzling is the planned AU military operation which is a part of the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative Against the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA). The headquarters and troops are meant to be operational as of March this year. South Sudan has already pledged 5000 troops to the AU military operation. There is already some 2000 Ugandan soldiers in the region  and a Congolese US trained battalion was deployed to LRA affected areas in the DRC by the end of 2011. As for the Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) only some 200 soldiers are in the Obo area where LRA has been spotted

I wonder how these troops will be able to protect civilians from LRA attacks and also avoid committing atrocities against the population themselves, which is not rare. The EU has been reluctant to support the AU regional initiative due to lack of accountability measures and legal mandate. The operation still has no UN mandate and would probably operate under AU flag as the decision comes from the AU heads of states and the AU Peace and Security Council

The AU Peace and Security Council’s decision on how to implement RCI-LRA is based on a report from the Chairman of the AU Commission. In the report  you can read that: “The RCI-LRA pursues the following objectives:

1.     strengthen the response capacity of the countries affected by the atrocities of the LRA, in order to create inherent capabilities;

2.    create an environment conducive to the stabilization of the region free of LRA atrocities and inclusive of a political process within the framework of the Juba Agreement, if and when duly signed; and

3.    facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected areas”

Furthermore the structure for command and control is described as follows: “[…] the command and control structure of the regional cooperation initiative against the LRA shall comprise the following components in order to execute the roles and tasks identified above:

1.     The Joint Coordination Mechanism - Chaired by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, the JCM shall be composed of the Ministers of Defense of the affected countries. The JCM will act as an ad hoc structure at strategic level to coordinate the efforts of the AU and the countries affected, with the support of the international partners. More specifically, the JCM shall coordinate all political and strategic activities with the affected countries and other stakeholders, enhance political and military cohesion, demonstrate firm intent and regional ability to achieve the end state of the operation, and coordinate capacity-building for the operational units, with a view to enhancing inter-operability and cooperation. The Secretariat of the JCM will be located in Bangui and will be coordinated by the AU Special Envoy for LRA, whose task is to provide the overall political and strategic coordination for the operation;

2.    The Regional Task Force -The RTF shall comprise national contingents from the affected countries, with both tactical combat and support units deployed under the operational command of the RTF Commander. 'The RTF shall have three sector Headquarters (HQs) located in Dungu (DRC), Nzara (South Sudan), and Obo (CAR). The RTF HQs shall comprise thirty officers and shall be located in Yambio, South Sudan. The key appointments for the RTF HQs have been agreed upon. The RTF HQs shall have appropriate civilian expertise. It shall also designate four liaison officers in the Joint Intelligenceand Operations Centre (JIOC), based in Dungu;

3.    The Joint Operations Centre - The JOC shall be a component of the RTF, and be co-located with the RTF HQs, in Yambio, with a total staff complement of 30 officers. Under the authority of the RTF Commander, it shall perform integrated planning and monitoring of the operation.”

Apparently the US has already put up operational bases in Djemah and Obo in CAR where the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) already operates. American military personnel is also deployed in Nzara, South Sudan.  A few days ago  I spoke to a friend who currently is in the Obo area in CAR and he told me that US drones are scanning the area for suspected rebels.

I really hope that a military operation will not result in LRA retaliation attacks as was the case after Operation Lightning Thunder in 2008 which resulted in more than 900 deaths in what has been labeled "The Christmas Massacre". Operation Lightning Thunder was a joint military operation with troops from Uganda, DRC and (then) South Sudan supported by the US. The objective was to bomb the LRA base in DRC and get rid of the leadership. It failed and had no plan what so ever of how to protect civilians. I hope that the actors involved now have learned from that mistake. 

It would be a shame if the civilian population once again was caught between the rebels and state security forces. Sometimes it’s hard to say what’s worse, the LRA or the regular forces that are meant to protect the population but fails to do so and instead  become yet another security threat...

Tuesday 24 January 2012

Price tag?

I used to dance to this song at the nightclubs in Bangui. The crowd mainly consisted of white men, black men, some white women and loads of women and girls from the Central African Republic and elsewhere in Africa.  We would all dance, me in front of the mirror a narcissist, and then all the other women who danced for other reasons than just vanity. Them, and me, would all dance throwing fake bills in the air, them singing “we just want money”. How ironic. And then about price tags, can you put a price tag on a person? In the Central African Republic very much yes… and elsewhere.


It is a damn shame.

Monday 16 January 2012

Report on LRA in Central Africa

On Friday I held a presentation of my report on LRA in Central Africa at the Swedish Defence Research Agency. It went well, we'll see what happens to the report and hopefully it will get published. I'll post a summary of the main findings shortly.

Good news! I'll write y Master's thesis at the Swedish Defence Research Agency this spring, albeit still affiliated with the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. This means I'll be able to work in an inspiring and creative environment with an extra supervisor who has experience from the field. Furthermore I'll write a report for the Agency based on the thesis.

I hope to be able to post more often and as I said I'll start with a summary of the findings from the report on the LRA. 

To get a grasp of the underlying reasons behind the US' support for an AU-led  military operation have a look at an article by Mareike Schomerus, Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot  published in Foreign Affairs in mid-November 2011.